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ABSTRACT 
Although an abundance of literature demonstrates that immigrant populations are less crime-prone 
than the native-born population, the majority of Americans believe that immigration inherently 
threatens the security of the United States.  Because Americans are not well versed in the complex 
issues of immigration and crime, public opinion is undoubtedly influenced by media outlets’ 
crafted narratives that simplify circumstances and events into easily digestible material.  The 
current study examines how media behavior changes and responds to social and political events 
by examining “frames” utilized in articles that produce narratives about immigration and crime.  
Using content analysis of over 1,700 articles published between 2014 and 2018, multi-level 
models reveal that (1) over half of articles describe immigrants as crime-increasing; (2) some 
frames are more likely to occur in response to specific events; and (3) some frames are less likely 
to occur in response to specific events.  I conclude with implications of consumer behavior and 
ongoing debates and research on immigration and crime.  
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INTRODUCTION  
Since the 1970s, the foreign-born population within the United States has increased over 300 
percent, even touching some rural and suburban communities that historically have not been 
major destinations of foreign-born population settlement (Edwards and Liu 2018; Lichter and 
Johnson 2009).  In turn, debate about how immigration has reshaped the social fabric of the 
United States has grown over the past several decades, as well.  Today, the politically driven 
criminalization of the foreign-born population remains a particularly prominent political and 
social debate (Ellis 2006), one that has been amplified by advancements in technological 
communication increasing access to the news and information allowing different (and often 
antagonistic) narratives to compete with those that are more fact-based (Milan 2017).  
The issue of narratives in news media remains an important feature of understanding 
immigration and the criminalization of the foreign born because the American population, in 
general, does not possess much direct knowledge regarding the intricacies of immigration policy 
and immigrant communities.  Instead, they often rely upon the media’s heuristic “framing” and 
priming in order to interpret and more easily digest information regarding such complex issues, 
like immigration and crime (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  Although this dynamic could 
work to educate the American public on the empirical relationship between immigration, crime, 
news media outlets provide platforms for “claimsmakers” – individuals, both legitimate and 
illegitimate, who provide statements and narratives – to push agendas that may be detrimental to 
the foreign-born population.  For example, recent research shows that news media narratives 
often link immigrants (especially the undocumented) to high crime rates (Harris and Gruenewald 
2019), despite widespread contradiction within empirical research that immigration more often 
reduces crime (Ousey and Kubrin 2018).  The crime-prone immigrant narrative is then made 
2 
easily consumable and accessible for audiences across the nation with little regulation. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, nearly two-thirds of Americans believe that immigrants make our communities 
less safe and threaten national security (Gallup 2017; Hohmann 2011; Pew Hispanic Center  
2015).  
The global community gained a heightened awareness of how powerful the media can be 
in shaping public sentiment about immigration and crime following the 2016 presidential 
election of Donald Trump.  Though the use of immigrants in this manner has been essential to 
American politics since the birth of the nation (Barber 1992; Grigoryan 2019), the 
immigrationcrime link became a primary element of Donald Trump’s platform when he asserted 
that  
Mexican immigrants were overwhelmingly responsible for increasing crime rates in the United  
States, even if some “are good people” (Finnegan 2016: A00).  Yet, this position contradicts 
longstanding findings within criminology regarding the crime decline in the United States since 
the 1990s and consensus that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes than their American 
counterparts (Gramlich 2019; Harris and Feldmeyer 2013; Ousey and Kubrin 2018).  Instead, 
Trump used the news media to help craft a narrative for widespread public consumption in order 
to advance specific policy ideas (e.g., the border wall).   
Critically for the purposes of this project, research shows that policymakers, policy 
entrepreneurs, and other “claimsmakers” strategically utilize the news media’s influence to push 
forward policy agendas, including those directed toward the immigration and crime.  Yet, there 
remain important empirical questions that have yet to be addressed.  In particular, there has been 
limited research into whether and how media narratives change around “focusing events” and 
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subsequent “policy windows,” which are the “opportunities for advocates of proposals to push 
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems” (Kingdon 1995: 165).  
Critically, the emergence of a policy window, which cultivates an environment for legislation to 
be pursued both locally and nationally, reflects “a confluence of events that allows advocates to 
push their policy solutions to problems onto the political agenda” (Farley et al. 2007:345).  
During this time (or even preceding it), narratives can be amplified by the news media, providing 
political claims makers a platform by which conflicting arguments and solutions can be 
disseminated to the general American population.  
Building on these observations, I ask the following question: how does media framing of 
immigration and crime change differ around focusing events and policy windows over the 
20142018 period?  This period is especially important to the immigration-crime debate in this 
period that (a) immigration overall has decreased, although the non-native born population is 
relatively high; (b) the economic boom of the late 1990s and early 2000s and the later Great 
Recession paved the way for historical rates of inequality in the United States through the 2010s; 
(c) the crime spike of the early-to-mid 1990s and subsequent decline in offending; as well as (d)
important immigration and crime events, like the expiration of DACA and deaths of Kate Steinle 
and Mollie Tibbetts.  In exploring this period, I aim to untangle how prominent national news 
articles narratively describe the immigration-crime link in unique ways in and around these key 
incidents.  
In seeking to address these questions, I extend the growing literature regarding news 
media influence on politics, society, and public opinion, as well as the academic study of policy 
windows themselves (Kingdon 1995).  Unfortunately, these topics traditionally have been 
studied without much consideration to the mechanisms by which they collectively shape the 
  4  
public and political landscape, especially in regard to the link between immigration and crime. 
Empirical evidence demonstrates that the media is capable of shaping (and reflecting) public 
opinion by selectively articulating specific narratives and employing frames both intentionally 
and unintentionally (Cervantes et al. 2018; Menjivar 2016).  At the same time, prior literature has 
also established that media framing of certain events can provide the circumstances by which the  
“politics stream” gains traction – a necessary element for the creation of a fruitful policy window 
(Farley et al. 2007; Menjivar 2016).  Overall then, I aim to bring together these various themes 
into an empirical examination of immigration-crime narratives over time and around focal 
events.  
More broadly, the relationship between news media framing relative to policy windows 
has considerable, intergenerational consequences for both American society and the international 
community by (in part) helping shape who the American public will consider to be deserving of 
a life lived inside the United States.  Likewise, it also impacts the measures that American 
policymakers will take to deter and deport those who do not by illustrating how the foreign born 
can become linked to social problems like crime.  That said, the purpose of the current project is 
to examine the relationship between the narratives employed by prominent news media regarding 
the foreign-born population and crime with a particular emphasis on and how those narratives 
correspond with important focusing events and policy windows over time.  
    
REVIEW OF PRIOR LITERATURE  
The Occupational Task of News Media  
News media outlets and their journalists perform a significant role in democracies by serving as 
the link between the general public and elite political decision makers.  Advancements in news 
communication technologies – particularly through smartphone applications – narrow the gap 
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between the public and the elite, reinforcing the illusion for many that the news media’s political 
leverage is a symptom of the 21st century.  Despite recent attention and concerns to the reliability 
of news media outlets, the processes or tactics utilized by contemporary news outlets to gain 
attention are neither novel nor unique; rather, news media creating a narrative or highlighting 
stories that evoke a strong emotional response are present across the national news media 
landscape and throughout time (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).  
As one illustration, the 1800 presidential election of Thomas Jefferson brought about 
highly politicized print news opinion pieces exaggerating the personal characteristics and 
leadership capabilities of both presidential candidates, including an anonymous warning to voters 
published in the Federalist Connecticut Courant. In particular, claims were made that the 
election of Jefferson would surely bring the country to its knees, describing an apocalyptic 
wasteland where “murder, robbery, rape, adultery, and incest [would] be openly taught and 
practiced” (Digital History 2016).  Although Jefferson ultimately became president, the 1800 
election cycle drew attention to the media’s lasting tradition of selectively granting attention to 
contentious topics that capture the attention of a national audience, coupled with framing 
mechanisms that guide public opinion to a desirable outcome, contingent to the media outlet’s 
bias (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).   
As a more recent example, the media transformed the national political environment 
around the publication of the 1998 Washington Post’s Special Report: The Starr Report.  The 
report, a lengthy federal government report authored by Independent Counsel Ken Starr, was 
published first through the Washington Post as an un-tampered document, followed by CNN and 
MSNBC with commentary.  The report delivered though news outlets reached an estimated 20 
million Americans, who read the report within two days of its publication (Kravetz 2009).  
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Within three months of the report’s publication, President Clinton was impeached.  Crucially, 
some outlets framed the report as an indication of Starr’s fascination with sexually explicit 
content, attempting to minimize the report as an exaggeration of President Clinton’s actions.  
Other outlets praised Starr’s report, acknowledging Starr’s authority and describing him as a 
public servant dedicated to justice.  Although Clinton was more than likely to be impeached 
consequential to the report’s findings, with or without mass publication, systematic framing of 
the report’s contents by ideologically divergent media outlets along with widespread access to 
the report ultimately contributed in part to the 1998 impeachment of President Clinton. The  
American public became widely aware of Clinton’s misconduct, while news outlets shaped 
narratives in ways that informed the public on how to respond to such transgressions.  
What these examples illustrate is that, because media outlets have a finite window to 
produce news stories, journalists allocate much of their coverage to “sudden, attention-grabbing 
events” that consequentially “[advance] issues on the [policy] agenda” by heightening public 
awareness of the issue at hand (Birkland 1998:53).  The process by which these editorial 
decisions are made, also referred to as agenda setting, is essential to understanding why some 
topics receive more coverage in the media than others, and how the public interprets this 
coverage in terms of urgency and necessity (Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).  Consequentially, 
media cycles often result in short, rapid streams of coverage for specific topics that harness the 
public’s attention as quickly as they lose it.  Agenda setting successfully alerts the public to 
social problems, but also struggles to produce meaningful solutions as a result of constantly 
revolving coverage of competing issues (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017).  On one hand, some 
scholars consider agenda setting a harmful consequence of coverage, rather than a systematic 
process by which the media seeks to advance the betterment of American society.  On the other 
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hand, as Birkland acknowledges, media coverage of focusing events has the potential to “serve 
as important opportunities for politically disadvantaged groups to champion messages…  
[previously] suppressed by dominant groups” (1998:54).  The discrepancy between these 
arguments rests upon the narrative – or frame – that journalists utilize, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, in the article.  
Framing  
Relevant to the current study, I highlight two key concepts that inform my discussion of media 
treatments of immigration and crime over time and that build on the overall news media process 
of agenda setting.  The first involves the manner in which media sources narratively describe – 
or frame – immigrants and immigration-related topics (I use the terms “frame” and “narrative” 
interchangeably).  Understanding narratives, or frames, is critical to understanding the role of 
media because narratives impose a “cognitive style or a mode of thinking” upon consumers of 
the information, ultimately manipulating readers’ interpretation of any given topic or issue (Ryan 
2007:27).  Media frames work to condense complicated, multifaceted circumstances into easily 
digestible stories by “selecting and highlighting some facets of events or issues, and making 
connections among them so as to promote a particular interpretation, evaluation, and/or solution”  
(Entman 2004:5).  Relevant to the current study, immigration and crime are both complex issues, 
including such issues as refugees from crime and immigrant caravans, criminal behavior displayed 
by specific immigrants or immigrant populations, the intricacies of foreign born status within the 
criminal justice system, and even issues surrounding the legality of the foreign-born population’s 
presence in the United States (i.e., undocumented immigration as a crime).   
More broadly, all news media articles display bias to some degree, even if they intend to 
deliver the most accurate and unbiased information possible (Wettstein and Wirth 2017).   
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Indeed, bias in the media has recently been associated with the spread of “fake news,” muddying 
the discrepancy between reliable news and manipulating media narratives.  In turn, this 
phenomenon appears hand in hand with the polarization of news media consumption in 
American society (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017).  Nevertheless, the media framing process 
capitalizes on the consumption of confusing and contentious stories by removing context from 
such stories and imposing a specific narrative, successfully drawing both attention and an 
emotional response from the outlet’s audience.  
A plethora of studies agree that agenda setting and framing are integral pieces of the news 
media production cycle and are fundamental to current power structures in the political landscape 
(Morstatter et al. 2018, Entman 2007).  Although both agenda setting and framing are not 
inherently detrimental to general understanding of a given topic, they do encompass a series of 
processes by which outlets prioritize coverage of specific events over others; falsify reality by 
distorting information; favor one interpretation of an event or policy over another interpretation 
of said event or policy; and/or allows personal bias of the reporter to bleed through to content 
production (Entman 2007).  In any case, agenda setting in news media is inevitable to some 
degree due to a variety of factors ranging from initial misreporting to the political leaning of a 
journalists’ outlet, and is “ultimately an attempt to persuade the opinion of the reader” to adopt a 
specific idea or perspective about a topic (Morstatter et al. 2018).  A growing body of literature 
agrees, though, that agenda setting – particularly in response to a focusing or political event – is 
neither random nor accidental, but rather patterned, intentional, and occurs systematically.    
For instance, specific to immigration and race, scholars retroactively acknowledge the  
“moral panic” presented in the media directed towards people of color during the 1980s and  
1990s as a classic example of agenda setting.  During this time, the American public was  
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“consumed by the looming threat posed by America’s [non-white] youth” via overrepresentation 
of events such as the Central Park Jogger case, in which five people of color were convicted of 
raping a white woman, and later exonerated (Moriearty 2010:850).  The criminal framing of 
nonwhite youths in the media heavily influenced public opinion and consequential policies 
aimed towards “controlling” this demographic by intentionally producing news stories in which 
white Americans were victimized by people of color and “outsiders”, either to promote personal 
bias or  
to increase readership.    
Changes in media behavior do not only occur in response to focusing events, such as the 
Central Park Jogger case, but also in response to shifts in the political landscape following 
election cycles, the passage of legislation, as well as periods of social unrest.  For instance, 
following the passage of Arizona State Bill 1070 in 2010, media framing of immigrants as 
threats to public security and the economy became increasingly prominent in both local and 
national newspapers.  Sequential media coverage exploring the intricacies of SB 1070 exposed 
the public’s misunderstanding about the legal proceedings of immigration and role of law 
enforcement in at the municipal level, as well as the ability of framing to manipulate public 
opinion in favor of anti-immigrant policies (Fryberg et al. 2012).    
A growing body of literature also suggests that in the past three decades, national news 
outlets have engaged in a tradition of emphasizing “the negative consequences of immigration” 
by increasing coverage of the socioeconomic conditions and crime rates of Latinx communities 
(Abrajano, Hajnal and Hassell 2017).  This increase in the prevalence of antagonistic frames – 
particularly in articles published by conservative news outlets – directed toward immigrants 
corresponds with a meaningful shift in public opinion.  Following even short-term exposure to 
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anti-immigrant framing, Americans become more accepting of civil rights violations against 
undocumented immigrants, economic policies that directly target immigrant communities, and 
social definitions outlining the differences between white and non-white groups (Fryberg et al.  
2012).  Bias and reasoning aside, scholars agree that the framing of non-white immigrants in the 
United States as inherently criminal and detrimental to the wellbeing of society is partially 
responsible for lasting racial inequalities social institutions, particularly the criminal justice 
system.    
Focusing Events and Policy Windows   
As a second set of key concepts, focusing events and policy windows remain important to news 
media in that they provide context for why certain topics (regardless of framing) are covered 
more than others.  Not all issues can make it to the top of any social or political agenda and, 
instead, must compete for attention from lawmakers, moral entrepreneurs, and other “claim 
makers” (Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Loseke 2003).  As such, news media periodically revive 
issues – like immigration and crime – as immediate concerns using specific and often 
sensationalized stories that serve as “focusing events” (Birkland 1998) to open up “policy 
windows” (Kingdon 2003).  It is this rapid onset of coverage that pushes social problems (again, 
like immigration and crime) onto the public stage before they are eventually replaced.  
Although focusing events and policy windows as concepts more frequently appear as the 
theoretical frameworks of policymaking, few scholars have attempted to operationalize the 
multifaceted elements of either beyond the original definitions delineated by Kingdon (1995 
[1984]).  As addressed by Ridde (2009), systematically exploring the mechanisms through which 
policy emerges is a complicated feat because the public policy process is “neither monolithic nor 
linear” but rather, a multi-stage process with countless actors pursuing competing agendas (p.  
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939).  Indeed, Kingdon’s “multiple-streams model” identifies three fundamental components – 
the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream – that together create the 
conditions for a successful policy window.  While this project does not attempt to causally link 
media narratives to focusing events or policy window outcomes, it does aim to establish that 
media behaviors, particularly the prevalence of certain frames, correspond with these events and 
policy cycles.  
Multiple-Streams Model  
Broadly, the multiple-streams models states that “a policy window of opportunity exists 
and policy change is most likely to occur” when all three streams coincide (McBeth and 
Lybecker 2018:871).  First, the problem stream emerges “when an existing condition is defined 
as a problem” and both by the public and policymakers deeming it worthy of being solved 
through legal intervention (Farley et al. 2007:344).  Problem streams transpire from focusing 
events – such as the 9/11 attacks, Hurricane Katrina, or the Sandy Hook Elementary School mass 
shooting, and rapidly gain national attention.  They may also emerge more gradually through the 
evolution of a social or environmental issue (e.g., global climate change, a housing crisis).  
Pertinent to this project, the amount of feedback from policymakers and citizens 
regarding a specific problem is significant to the likelihood that change will occur.  Feedback can 
be defined as the national conversation between the political elite and the general population, 
moderated by attention granted by the media (Farley et al. 2007).  It is through feedback that the 
role of media in the policy process is highlighted; journalists and media organizations “fulfil an 
important double-function in a democracy by informing the public of political processes and 
reflecting the public opinion for the political elites” (Wettstein and Wirth 2017:262).  
Second, as the problem stream gains national attention, a policy stream emerges.   
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Comprised of potential solutions to the problem presented and advocated for by different “claim 
makers” competing for national attention, the policy stream is constrained by the attention and 
approval of political decision makers, a notably limited resource.  Different stakeholders “thus  
[produce] a short list of proposals” that are “technically feasible, acceptable in the policy 
community, and in line with current budget priorities” (Farley et al. 2007:346).  Much of this 
involves capitalizing on a focusing event by immediately providing media outlets with a policy 
narrative promoting a pre-existing solution – a process known as “problem surfing” (Kingdon 
1995; Boscarino 2009).  
Third, the political stream emerges and is “composed of such things as public mood, 
pressure group campaigns, election results,” as well as “partisan or ideological distributions in 
congress”, the politics stream reflects the national mood regarding support of specific policy 
solutions (Kingdon 1984:152; McBeth and Lybecker 2018).  The political stream indicates the 
political receptibility displayed by the general population and policy decision makers toward 
certain solutions.  The political stream also highlights which groups adhere to which political 
narratives as relayed by the media (Chermak and Weiss 1997).  
The key takeaway from the multiple-streams model is that news coverage of political 
issues (like immigration and crime), including the narratives promoted by media outlets, is 
significant in the democratic process and is highly influential in policy outcomes (Birkland 1998; 
Chermak and Weiss 1997; Menjivar 2016).  That is, news media framing of social problems that 
takes place around focusing events and policy windows is an integral part of the news making 
process.  Yet, whether and how news media frames change around these focusing events and 
policy windows remains empirically unsettled, a gap that the current project seeks to fill.   
  13  
THE CURRENT STUDY  
Overall then, the goal of this project is to build on prior research indicating that focusing events 
and policy windows are consequential times for media agenda setting and, in turn, for 
highlighting changes in the news narratives that describe substantive positions for social 
problems, like immigration and crime.  Thus, my research question is as follows: how does 
media framing of immigration and crime change around focusing events and policy windows 
over the 2014-2018 period?    
Data  
To answer this question, I draw data from nationally prominent, English-language newspaper 
articles with a circulation of over 100,000 published between 2014 and 2018, archived through  
LexisNexis Academic (now NexisUni).  Seven papers satisfy these criteria: The New York Times;  
The Washington Post; USA Today; St. Louis Post-Dispatch; The Buffalo News; Orange County  
Register; St. Petersburg Times/Tampa Bay Times.   
  Using the LexisNexis repository, I conducted a filtered search for these newspapers 
collecting articles with the words “immigrant” or “immigration” within five words of “crime” or  
“violence” present within the body of the article, with an additional filter to remove duplicate 
articles.  Subsequently, I employed an ethnographic content analysis to code articles for frames 
as defined by Harris and Gruenewald (2019), excluding international immigration-crime articles 
and articles irrelevant or ambiguous within the immigration-crime debate.    
The ethnographic content analysis process encompasses not only the collection of 
documents from various information outlets, but also the reflexive interpretation of underlying 
themes, messages, and meanings; the development of qualitative and quantitative content 
analysis protocol; and the influence of the grounded theory approach (Altheide and Schneider 
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2013, Harris and Gruenewald 2019).  For the purpose of this study, these themes, messages, and 
meanings are systematically coded by the presence of six frames, guided by prior empirical 
criminological and sociological research.  Because constant discovery and comparison are 
embedded in the process of ECA, it is crucial to acknowledge that the six frames analyzed in this 
study do not encompass all of the conversations revolving around immigration and crime in the 
media.  To accommodate for the range of additional conversations that do not fall within the 
specific boundaries of the six frames utilized in this study, a seventh option – the ambiguous 
frame – was included in the process.  Articles with frames that do not conform to the six outlined 
in this study were coded only as ambiguous and removed from the sample.  Overall, while this 
current study is limited to years 2014 through 2018, it contributes Harris and Gruenewald’s 
previously collected and coded dataset ranging from years 1990 through 2013.  Elimination of 
duplicate, international, and ambiguous articles resulted in a final sample size of 1,720 articles 
with a total of 3,276 frames.   
  
    
Unit of Analysis  
In this study, I focus on individual articles as my unit of analysis.  Utilizing articles as a unit of 
analysis is a valuable asset to any study concerning news media behavior, increasingly so in an 
era defined by nearly instantaneous consumer access to both news media itself as well as the 
political elites and journalists who fuel, interpret, and disseminate national discourse through 
various print and media platforms (Karnowski, Leonhard, and Kümpel 2017).  Articles, 
particularly those sourced from the seven papers that meet this study’s criteria, are a valuable 
unit of analysis because (1) each article itself is a discrete unit, (2) each article has the capacity to 
address the immigration-crime link independent of its paper’s political leaning by employing any 
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or all of the frames listed, and (3) the papers from which my sample is sourced are highly 
circulated in the United States, with a combined daily subscription-based print readership of over  
3.3 million Americans.  Because this measure is conservative in that it does not include “unique 
visitors” who access articles through free monthly allowances, or online-only readers, including 
those with subscriptions to any of the papers which meet this study’s criteria, it can be assumed 
that these articles reach a considerably large proportion of American consumers.    
As such, because articles are discrete units published at one specific point in time by only 
one paper, they can be contextualized by shifts in the national political landscape, such as the 
emergence of a policy window or focusing event, as well by other attributes, including whether 
the article appears on the front page or not and how many words each article contains.  Articles 
also grant insight to the exclusive world of professional news making because they highlight the 
final results of the news journalistic process, by which editors produce stories on certain topics 
with specific narratives while simultaneously excluding others (Paulussen et al. 2007).    
  
Dependent Variable – Article Frames  
My dependent variables are frames as they appear in each article, specifically the six news media 
narratives as identified by Harris and Gruenewald (2019): (1) criminogenic, (2) protective, (3) 
the act of immigration itself as a crime, (4) immigrants as victims of crime, (5) immigrants as 
refugees from crime, and (6) a frame discussing the civil and/or legal rights of immigrants within 
the criminal justice system.  Because narratives are not mutually exclusive of one another, it will 
be assumed that all six narratives can potentially appear in any given article.  
Immigration as criminogenic.  The criminogenic frame encompasses the general belief 
expressed by American society that immigrants are crime-prone and that immigration as a 
process is corrosive to the security of the United States, even if immigrants aren’t themselves 
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committing crime.  Articles with the criminogenic frame often validate pre-existing prejudices 
about the immigrant population by providing coverage of the criminal acts of specific 
individuals, or by acknowledging fears of crime among the foreign-born population as a whole.  
Coverage of events, such as the accidental shooting of Kathryn Steinle by undocumented 
immigrant José Inez García Zárate, for example, exemplifies the criminogenic frame.  Bump’s  
2015 Washington Post article describes the event as Kathryn being “viciously killed by a 5-time 
deported Mexican with a long criminal record, who was forced back into the United States 
because they didn’t want him in Mexico.”  As another example, a 2014 New York Times article 
by Damien Cave documenting Mexican immigration quotes a spokesman for the Tulsa County 
sheriff’s office describing that “as an illegal alien it’s really difficult to find a bona fide job… but 
it’s really easy to turn to the drug world and start selling drugs on the corner” (P. 12).   
Immigration as protective against crime.  Articles displaying the protective frame typically 
utilize empirical evidence regarding immigrants and immigration to challenge the belief that 
immigrants are dangerous, often asserting that immigrants actually make American communities 
safer.  For example, an article published in the Tampa Bay Times describes conflict between the 
city of Santa Fe’s sympathetic immigration policy and federal immigration authorities, citing 
studies concluding that “immigrants are less prone to commit crime than people born in the 
United States” (Valverde 2016).  This frame often directly contradicts the criminogenic frame 
identified above. 
Immigration as a crime.  Although the act of improperly entering the United States is a 
misdemeanor criminal offense, news sources tend to misrepresent simply being in the United  
States without documentation as a criminal offense rather than the civil violation that it is.  
Articles that engage in a discussion of the criminality of undocumented immigration, particularly 
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how this demographic assimilates in American society, display this frame.  For example, 
throughout 2014, the Mexican-American border crisis was well documented in national 
newspaper outlets, with calls for policy or structural changes to accommodate for “the increase 
in illegal border crossings in recent years” whether such change coming in the form of a 
complete border wall, or a pathway to U.S. citizenship (O’Keefe 2014:5).  Likewise, a 2010 
Washington Post article illustrates the same theme in quoting an Arizona resident reflecting on a 
crime-control policy: “When [Governor Jan] Brewer brought this forth, she did it for those of us 
on the front lines,’ Bob Dekoschak said. ‘Those of us armed. Those of us with illegals running 
through our yards.’” (McCrummen 2010: A01).  
Immigrants as victims of crime.  Articles that contain the victims frame “describe either 
the direct victimization of particular immigrants or discuss the vulnerability of the foreign-born 
population to crime and violence” (Harris and Gruenewald 2019:8).  While some newspapers 
tend to report criminal offenses committed by immigrants, other articles, such as a 2017 New 
York Times article, report stories of the vulnerability of immigrants, with consideration to 
empirical evidence that this group is more likely to be victimized than their American 
counterparts (Medina 2017:2).  Medina describes the situation of a nonprofit agency struggling 
to help victims of domestic violence in Orange County, in which “nearly half of the more than 70 
new cases that [the agency] received each month came from undocumented immigrants.”   
Immigrants as refugees from crime.  Articles that highlight the plight of immigrants 
escaping their war and violence-torn countries of origin by seeking safety in the United States are 
identified as using the refugee frame.  These stories often include a personal account of why an 
individual flees, such as a Washington Post article describing a Honduran teenager’s account of 
being tortured, “kidnapped, drugged, starved, [and] raped by ‘eight or nine’ MS-13 gang 
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members” over the course of ten days as an act of revenge against her family, forcing her to flee 
to the United States or risk death (Henneberger 2014).    
Civil and legal rights of immigrants.  Finally, some articles are less concerned with 
criminal offenses committed by immigrants (or victimization, etc.), but tend to articulate on  
“either the ambiguity of immigrant rights without our criminal justice systems or on new policies 
designed to change the rights of foreign-born persons” typically with the goal of integrating this 
community into the criminal justice system (Harris and Gruenewald 2019:9).  This frame is 
present when an article describes issues such as “[the replacement of] Secure Communities with 
a new Priority Enforcement Program, which would only seek custody of immigrants convicted of 
certain serious crimes” (Editorial Board 2015:18).  Importantly, this frame often appears with 
alongside other frames (e.g., criminogenic), but can also occur on its own when discussing issues 
of the foreign born within the criminal justice system (e.g., bail, visitation rights, participation of 
local justice agencies with federal enforcement, etc.).  
Independent Variables – Policy Windows and Focusing Events  
Given the focus of the current study on framing relative at specific points in time, my 
independent variables are policy windows and focusing events.  Unfortunately, there is no agreed 
upon amount of time that is thought to constitute either event.  Some periods may be lengthy – 
for example, the debate leading up to the 1996 Immigration Reform and Control Act – in which 
news media framing may change more gradually, take place leading up to and after the 
event/window, and/or change for longer periods of time.  In other cases, events may be short and 
acute – for example, the Kathryn Steinle shooting or the 9/11 attacks and passage of the Patriot 
Act in 2001 – where media narratives change quickly and for shorter periods of time.    
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Utilizing Kingdon’s multiple-steams framework, I have identified eight focusing events 
and three policy windows regarding the immigration-crime link occurring during the 2014 to 
2018 period.  While many focusing events and policy windows did occur throughout this period, 
only policy windows and focusing events that were discussed multiple times in each of the seven 
outlets are included in this analysis.  To ensure a conservative measure, each focusing event is 
operationalized by a one to three-month period beginning on the specific date that the event 
occurred and ending after a specified interval allowing for national discourse, while each policy 
window’s duration is limited to one month.  A dummy variable was created to encapsulate each 
individual policy window and focusing event time period, allowing me to determine which 
articles were published during these intervals and which articles were not (1 = the article was 
published during a policy window or focusing event; 0 = no, the article was not published during 
a policy window or focusing event).  
Focusing Event 1:  The Central American Migrant Crisis.  The Central American  
Migrant Crisis emerges during the summer of 2014 “as record numbers of unaccompanied 
children and families crossed the U.S.-Mexico border”, resulting in an unprecedented increase in 
border apprehensions (Stinchcomb and Hershberg 2014:5).  The U.S. Senate Committee on 
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs holds a hearing on July 9, 2014 as detention 
center and temporarily shelter capacities decrease, protests in the southwest become more 
frequent, and border tensions escalate.  Focusing Event 1 begins on May 15, 2014 and ends 
August 15, 2014 – a three-month interval – to account for increases in border crossings leading 
up to the peak in June as well as national discourse following the July 9 hearing.   
Focusing Event 2:  Donald Trump’s Candidacy Announcement.  On June 16, 2015 
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Donald Trump makes a speech officially announcing his presidential candidacy for the upcoming 
2016 election cycle.  It is during this speech that Trump discloses his platform and speculates on 
the character of Mexican immigrants, claiming that “They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing 
crime. They’re rapists” (Time 2015).  Focusing Event 2 begins June 16, 2015 and ends July 16, 
2015, allowing a one-month interval for public response.   
Focusing Event 3:  Accidental Shooting of Kate Steinle.  The accidental shooting and 
death of Kate Steinle on July 1, 2015 by undocumented immigrant José Inez García Zárate 
makes national headlines, further contributing to public dissonance regarding the 
immigrationcrime link.  Proponents of anti-immigration legislation target San Francisco’s 
sanctuary city policies as a threat to national security and the wellbeing of Americans.  Although 
the death of Kate Steinle has prevailed in the immigration-crime link debate since the shooting, 
this event begins on July 1, 2015 and ends one month later on August 1, 2015.   
Focusing Event 4: Presidential Election of Donald Trump.  Donald Trump is elected 
president of the United States on November 8, 2016 and sworn into office on January 20, 2017.  
The election of Donald Trump is significant to the immigration-crime link debate due to his 
office’s commitment to the criminalization and deportation of undocumented immigrants and 
endorsement of increased border security measures, including the completion of a wall along the 
U.S.-Mexico border.  To account for the election as well as the public’s response leading up to
the inauguration of Donald Trump, Focusing Event 4 begins on November 8, 2016 and ends 
January 20, 2017.   
Focusing Event 5: Central American Migrant Caravan of Spring 2018.  In March 2018, a 
caravan of approximately 700 primarily Honduran migrants begin a trek from Tapachula, 
Chiapas, Mexico to the U.S-Mexico border.  By their arrival on April 29, 2018, the caravan has 
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grown to nearly 1,200 migrants despite discouragement from several Trump administration 
officials, including attorney general Jeff Sessions, claiming the caravan to be “a deliberate 
attempt to undermine our laws and overwhelm our system” (Semple and Jordan 2018).  As such, 
Focusing Event 5 begins March 25, 2018 and concludes May 29, 2018.    
Focusing Event 6: Children in Cages.  Following the arrival of the Central American  
Migrant Caravan in April 2018 and consequential changes to immigration detention policies in 
May 2018, conditions of detention centers make national news headlines as journalists permitted 
to visit these centers publish images of migrant children being separated from their parents and 
detained in cages, as well as multiple accounts of the mistreatment of these undocumented 
minors.  Focusing Event 6 begins June 1, 2018 and ends August 1, 2018, a two-month period 
encapsulating early visits to detention centers by politicians and reporters, followed by one 
month of consequential public discussion.    
Focusing Event 7: Murder of Mollie Tibbetts.  On July 18, 2018, University of Iowa 
student Mollie Tibbetts disappears while jogging and is reported missing the following day.   
Approximately one month later on August 21, 2018, undocumented immigrant Cristhian Bahena 
Rivera leads authorities to Tibbetts’ body in a nearby cornfield after confessing to her abduction 
and murder.  The murder of Mollie Tibbetts becomes highly politicized as opponents of illegal 
immigration utilized this event to strengthen the link between immigration and crime, despite the  
Tibbetts family’s public denouncement of such claims.  Focusing Event 7 begins on the day of  
Tibbetts’ disappearance, July 18, 2018, and ends September 18, 2018, approximately one month 
after the identification and arrest of suspect Rivera.    
Focusing Event 8: 2018 Midterm Elections.  The 2018 United States midterm elections 
are held on November 6, 2018.  The 2018 midterm elections are significant to the current study 
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due to the political atmosphere in which the immigration-crime link debate is a primary element 
of both Republican and Democratic platforms.  The elections are also significant due to high 
voter turnout, in which “fifty-three percent of the citizen voting-age population” participate in 
the 2018 midterm elections, up eleven percent from the previous 2014 midterm election (Misra 
2019).  Focusing Event 8 begins October 6, 2018 and concludes December 6, 2018; this 
twomonth period includes one month prior to the 2018 midterm election and one month 
following the midterm election.   
Policy Window 1: DACA Expansion.  On November 20, 2014, President Obama 
announced that within 90 days the USCIS would expand DACA (the Deferred Action for 
Childhood Arrivals program), allowing undocumented immigrants in the program to remain in 
the United States temporarily without fear of immediate deportation as well as the opportunity 
for employment authorization (USCIS 2015 A).  This announcement came with a series of other 
executive actions with the intent to crack down on illegal immigration along the U.S.-Mexico 
border; prioritize the deportation of felons rather than families; termination of the Secure  
Communities program managed by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); and to 
implement requirements for a series of background checks and taxes for those who wish to 
receive deferred action (USCIS 2015 B).  Policy Window 1 begins on November 20, 2014, the 
date that the executive actions were announced, and ends December 20, 2014, allowing 
onemonth for public discourse.   
Policy Window 2: Reinstatement of Secure Communities.  On January 25, 2017, just five 
days after his inauguration, newly elected President Trump reinstates the Secure Communities 
program previously halted by President Obama’s 2014 executive actions on immigration.  Secure 
Communities utilizes a “federal information-sharing partnership between DHS and the FBI that 
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helps to identify in-custody aliens” desirable by the Trump administration for deportation 
(USICE 2018), and has grown to be a point of contention in the immigration-crime link debate 
and American politics, along with the transparency of ICE.  Policy Window 2 begins on January 
25, 2017, the date that President Trump signed the executive order, and concludes on February 
25, 2017.  This interval provides one month for public discourse and responses from prominent 
news media outlets.   
Policy Window 3: Expiration of DACA and Sanctuary City Lawsuit.  March 5, 2018,  
DACA expires with without renewal legislation or additional executive actions in place, leaving 
nearly 700,000 undocumented immigrants in a legal freefall.  The following day, March 6, 2018, 
the U.S. Department of Justice files a lawsuit amounting “to a pre-emptive strike against  
[California’s] so-called sanctuary laws” (Benner and Medina 2018) in response to the January 
2018 passage of SB 54 – the California Values Act – “which limits state and local law 
enforcement officers’ ability to communicate with federal immigration authorities about a 
person’s immigration status (Villazor and Gulasekaram 2018:556).  Both events result in a policy 
window beginning March 5, 2018 and concluding April 6, 2018, a one-month interval following 
both events to allow for public response.   
Additional Control Variables  
Other article-level variables were also coded, including (1) whether or not the article appeared on 
the front page of the newspaper; (2) the word count of the article; (3) whether the article’s story 
concerns international or domestic issues; (4) the year of publication, in order to account for 
trending over time; and (5) which of the seven newspaper outlets printed the article (to capture 
publication effects shared by articles from the same paper).   
Analytic Strategy  
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To answer my research question regarding whether and how immigration-crime media narratives 
change over time in correspondence with focusing events and policy windows, I first examine 
the prevalence of each frame throughout the 2014 – 2018 period.  As a second step, I use each of 
the variables identified above to predict article frames across the pooled cross-section of all 
articles from 2014 – 2018.  My key outcome is the presence of each narrative frame (dummy 
coded for whether they appear in an article or not) with my key independent variable being 
whether an article was published during a policy window/focusing event, controlling for time, 
publication, and other key article-level covariates.  Given the dichotomous nature of my 
dependent variables, I use logistic regression analysis, constructing a model for each of the frame 
outcomes and comparing across them in terms of the effect of policy windows on the likelihood 
of a frame being used in an article.  
FINDINGS 
Table 1 displays the means and standard deviations for each of the six dependent variables, eight 
focusing events, three policy windows, and all other article-level variables included in this study.  
First, I note that some immigration-crime frames appear more frequently than others. For 
example, the criminogenic frame appears in over half of the 1,720 articles included in the sample 
(55 percent), followed closely by the “immigration as crime” frame, which appears in 
approximately 44 percent of all articles in the sample.  These frames tend to be increasingly 
antagonistic towards immigrants, appearing primarily in articles that perpetuate the 
immigrationcrime link by repeatedly highlighting criminal behavior displayed by a select few 
individual immigrants, and further generalizing this behavior to the general immigrant 
population.  In comparison, the civil/legal frame, which addresses issues such as the legal 
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ambiguity of undocumented immigrants and legality of sanctuary cities, appears in 
approximately 42 percent of all articles.  The sympathetic-leaning frames, specifically the 
protective and victims frames, appear far less frequently in the sample than the more antagonistic 
frames mentioned above.  The protective frame, which describes immigrants as less crime-prone 
than their native-born counterparts, appears in approximately 21 percent of all articles in the 
sample, while the victims frame highlighting the increased likelihood of immigrant victimization 
appears in only 13 percent of all articles.  Lastly, the refugees frame appears in 15 percent of all 
articles.   
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Sample of Articles (n = 1,720)   
Variables Mean Std. Dev.  
Frames (n=3276) 
Criminogenic  0.55 0.50 
Protective 0.21 0.41 
Imm. As Crime 0.44 0.50 
Victims 0.13 0.33 
Refugees 0.15 0.36 
Civil/Legal 0.42 0.49 
All Focusing Events 0.26 0.44 
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 0.04 0.19 
FE: Trump Candidacy 0.03 0.17 
FE: Kate Steinle 0.04 0.19 
FE: Trump Election 0.06 0.23 
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2 0.02 0.14 
FE: Kids in Cages 0.04 0.19 
FE: Mollie Tibbetts 0.03 0.18 
FE: 2018 Midterms 0.03 0.17 
All Policy Windows  0.09 0.29 
PW: DACA Expansion 0.02 0.12 
PW: Secure Communities 0.06 0.23 
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PW: DACA Expiration 0.02 0.13 
2014 0.10 0.30 
2015 0.15 0.36 
2016 0.28 0.45 
2017 0.28 0.45 
2018 0.20 0.40 
Word Count (ln) 6.84 0.65 
Front Page   0.14 0.34 
Note: Articles may have more than one frame so percentages do not sum to 100. 
Second, Table 1 also shows that articles published during focusing events make up about 
26 percent of all articles, while only about 9 percent of articles are published during policy 
windows.  In fact, two events/windows stand out as particularly prominent times when 
immigration-crime articles are published. The first is the Trump election, when 6 percent of all 
articles between 2014 and 2018 were published, while the second is the passage of the Secure 
Communities Act, when another 6 percent of articles were published. No other policy window or 
focusing event had more than 4 percent of articles published during their time periods.  
Finally, third, Table 1 shows that few immigration-crime articles appear on the front page 
of these large, national papers (only about 14 percent) and articles are, on average, about 934 
words in length (e6.84). However, there are important differences in when these articles were 
published. Twenty-eight percent of all immigration-crime articles were published in the years 
2016 and 2017, whereas only 20 percent of all articles were published in 2018, 15 percent in  
2015, and only 10 percent in 2014. Not surprisingly, the election and inauguration years 
(20162017) of Donald Trump are the years with the most articles written, dovetailing with the 
same observation regarding the focusing events above.  
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Figure 1. Comparison of Frame Prevalence, 2014-2018 
To better illustrate the frequency of specific immigration-crime narratives relative to key 
events/windows, Figure 1 depicts the prevalence of each individual frame as it appears during all 
focusing events, all policy windows, or during any other time during the 2014 to 2018 era.  Other 
periods, also referred to as outlying periods, refer to time intervals that are absent of a focusing 
event or policy window.  First, I note that only the criminogenic and victims frames appear more 
frequently during outlying periods than during focusing events and policy windows.  Second, the 
protective frame is the only frame that appears more often during focusing events than policy 
windows and outlying periods.  Third, the immigration as a crime frame, civil/legal frame, and 
refugees frame all occur more frequently during policy windows than focusing events and 
outlying periods.  Taken together, some frames appear more frequently during policy windows 
and focusing events (civil/legal, refugee, immigration as a crime, protective), while other frames 
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appear at higher rates during periods outside of those policy windows and focusing events 
(criminogenic, victims). However, I note that this may be because the majority of articles are 
published during these other periods, as indicated in Table 1.  I return to this issue in my 
multivariate models.  
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Figure 2. Changes in Frame Prevalence Over Time, 2014-2018 
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Figure 3. Changes in Frame Prevalence Over time, 2014-2018
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  To further illustrate changes in framing over time, Figure 2 shows the monthly prevalence 
over the study period for the most prevalent frames (criminogenic, immigration as a crime, 
civil/legal), while Figure 3 does the same for the less prevalent narratives (protective, refugees, 
victims).  Beginning with Figure 2, from 2014 to 2018, the prevalence of the civil/legal frame 
appears to decrease, excluding one spike in prevalence during the winter of 2014 (in 
correspondence with Policy Window 1, the announcement of the DACA expansion).   
Simultaneously throughout the 2014 to 2018 period, the criminogenic and immigration as crime 
frames steadily increase.  The criminogenic frame first begins to increase in prevalence during 
the spring of 2014 (around the time of Focusing Event 1, the Central American Migrant Crisis) 
and then subsequently spiking in the fall of 2015 (near the time of Focusing Event 3, the 
accidental murder of Kate Steinle by undocumented immigrant José Inez García Zárate).  
Likewise, the immigration as crime frame steadily increases over time, with one spike in 
prevalence occurring during the spring of 2014 (in correspondence with Focusing Event 1), and 
two notable spikes later occurring during the summer of 2015 around the time of Focusing Event 
2, Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy announcement.    
Meanwhile, Figure 3 shows that although the prevalence of the victims frame decreases 
overall, two significant spikes in prevalence occur during 2014 and 2015.  The first spike in 
prevalence of the victims frame occurs in spring of 2014 during Focusing Event 1 (the Central 
American migrant crisis), while the second spike occurs approximately one year later during 
spring 2015.  While the protective frame overall increases in prevalence over time, there are four 
notable increase events as visualized by Figure 3.  The first spike occurs in the spring of 2014 as 
the migrant crisis emerges, while the second spike appears during fall 2015 following the Kate 
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Steinle death.  The third spike in the prevalence of the protective frame appears during the 
summer of 2016 prior to the presidential election of Donald Trump.  Finally, the fourth spike in 
prevalence of the protective frame appears in the spring of 2018 in correspondence with the 
expiration of DACA and the emergence of a second Central American Migrant Caravan.  Lastly, 
Figure 3 depicts the refugees frame gradually increasing over the 2014 to 2018 period, featuring 
two noteworthy spikes in the prevalence of this frame.  The first spike in prevalence occurs 
during the spring and summer of 2014 as the Central American migrant crisis begins to make 
national headlines in the United States, while the second spike occurs during spring 2016.     
Overall then, Figures 2 and 3 depict increases in the criminogenic frame, immigration as 
crime frame, protective frame, and refugees frame throughout the 2014 to 2018 period, while 
also showing decreases in the civil/legal and victims frames.  Spikes in the prevalence of each 
frame tend to correspond with specific focusing events and policy windows as well.  However, 
while instructive, the figures and tables presented above are only descriptive and cannot take into 
account that some of these patterns in immigration-crime framing may be due to external factors 
(e.g., larger national trends each year) or characteristics of news making (e.g., longer articles, 
more front page coverage) at specific points in time.  To systematically examine how narrative 
framing might differ during policy windows and focusing events net of other important 
covariates, I construct a series of multivariate models.  
Turning to the multivariate analyses, Table 2 displays the results of logistic regression 
models predicting the likelihood that a frame will be present in an article during any focusing 
event or policy window, including front page publication, logged word count, and year of 
publication with 2014 serving as the reference.  Table 3 displays the same results of logistic 
regression models, but predicting the likelihood that a frame will appear in an article as a 
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function of each individual focusing event and policy window. For all models in Table 2 and 3, I 
cluster the standard errors across papers to account for unmeasured similarities in articles that 
appear in the same newspaper outlets.  
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Odds of a Frame Appearing in an Article as a 
Function of Focusing Events, Policy Windows, and Other Key Covariates (n=1,720)  
Focusing 
 Event 
Frames 
Criminogenic Protective 
Imm. As 
Crime Victims Refugees 
Civil / 
Legal 
1.092 1.210 1.273 0.804 1.279* 0.966 
(0.311) (.269) (.179) (.194) (.155) (.982) 
Policy 
Window 0.966 1.252 1.431* 0.499** 1.357 1.202* 
(.130) (.254) (.231) (.119) (.361) (.100) 
2015 8.163*** 12.790*** 3.207*** 1.274 0.461** 0.847 
(3.069) (4.668) (.981) (.362) (.128) (.179) 
2016 8.500*** 5.899*** 4.622*** 0.566* 0.558*** 0.724* 
(2.935) (1.532) (.863) (.144) (.086) (.117) 
2017 11.569*** 8.900*** 7.549*** 1.471* 0.781 1.393 
(4.676) (3.268) (1.477) (.234) (.175) (.239) 
2018 12.885*** 7.507*** 8.949*** 0.577 0.714 1.532** 
(3.779) (2.308) (2.889) (.171) (.192) (.203) 
Word Count 
(ln) 
1.101 1.022 1.286*** 0.966 1.444* 1.216* 
(.098) (.113) (.068) (.088) (.246) (.096) 
Front Page 0.985 0.572** 1.305 0.844 1.026 1.168 
(.196) (.105) (.209) (.213) (.160) (.193) 
Constant 0.073*** 0.031*** 0.024*** 0.220* 0.019 0.175** 
(.051) (.025) (.010) (.161) (.027) (.096) 
Pseudo R2 .0678 .0432 .0691 .0317 .0198 .0220 
34 
Note: Odds ratios displayed with a standard error in parenthesis.  All models included paper 
clustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the same 
outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)   
Beginning with Table 2, I note five key findings.  First, there are few systematic 
differences in the likelihood of a frame appearing in an article during focusing events, except for 
one exception.  Holding all other variables constant, articles published during a focusing event 
are approximately 28 percent more likely to include the refugee frame than articles not published 
during a focusing event (odd ratio = 1.279, 𝑝<.05).  Yet, second, policy windows are more likely 
to include several frames (and less likely to include one frame).  Specifically, articles published 
during a policy window are 43 percent more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame 
(odds ratio = 1.431, 𝑝<.05) and approximately 20 percent more likely to include the civil/legal 
frame (odds ratio = 1.202, 𝑝<.05), but are nearly 50 percent less likely to include the victims 
frame (odd ratio = .499, 𝑝<.01).    
Third, Table 2 also shows that articles published from 2015 to 2018 have greater odds of 
the criminogenic, protective, and immigration as a crime frames being present within the article 
than articles published in 2014.  Fourth, some frames are less likely to be present in articles over 
time.  Specifically, the refugees frame is nearly 54 percent less likely to be present in articles 
published during 2015 and approximately 44 percent less likely to be present in articles 
published during 2016, as compared to articles published during 2014.  Similarly, the civil/legal 
frame is less likely to appear in articles published during 2016 than articles published during  
2014, although the likelihood of the civil/legal frame appearing in an article published during 
2018 is 53 percent greater than articles published during 2014.  Lastly, articles published on the 
front page of a newspaper are nearly 43 percent less likely to include the protective frame (odds 
ratio = .572, 𝑝<.01) than articles not published on the front page.   
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Odds of a Frame Appearing in an Article as a 
Function of Focusing Events, Policy Windows, and Other Key Covariates  
Frames 
Criminogenic Protective 
Imm. As 
Crime Victims Refugees 
Civil / 
Legal 
FE: CA Migrant 
 Crisis 
1.116 0.841 1.416       0.645*  5.087*** 0.822 
(.687) (.148) (.719) (.130) (1.146) (.179) 
FE: Trump 
Candidacy 2.672*** 1.857) 0.610* 0.572 0.482 
0.464 
*** 
(.568) (1.045) (.153) (.173) (.242) (.096) 
FE: Kate 
Steinle 
3.654*** 1.990 2.068*** 0.691 0.533* 1.203 
(1.353) (.908) (.346) (.463) (.159) (.283) 
FE: Trump 
Election 0.471*** 0.811 1.464*** 1.494** 0.430* 
1.964 
*** 
(.080) (.213) (.097) (.196) (.177) (.328) 
FE: CA Migrant 
 Crisis 2 
0.840 0.649 0.893 0.603 1.924*** 1.079 
(.347) (.184) (.312) (.283) (.229) (.396) 
FE: Kids in  
Cages 
1.187 1.314 1.615 0.565 2.251** 1.089 
(.180) (.359) (.471) (.292) (.534) (.307) 
FE: Mollie  
Tibbetts 
1.044 0.930 1.108 0.983 1.159 
0.437 
*** 
(.191) (.231) (.463) (.511) (.347) (.062) 
FE: 2018 
Midterms 0.536* 0.497* 0.399* 1.526 1.960*** 
0.578 
** 
(.145) (.161) (.159) (1.617) (.309) (.105) 
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Note: Odds ratios displayed with standard errors in parenthesis.  All models include 
paperclustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the 
same outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)  
Table 3, Cont.   
Frames 
PW: DACA 
Expansion 
Criminogenic Protective 
Imm. As 
Crime Victims Refugees 
Civil / 
Legal 
1.396 
0.968 0.594 0.189* 0.334 1.224 
(.720) (1.211) (.359) (.157) (.413) (.495) 
PW: Secure 
Communities 0.948 1.306 1.507 0.477* 2.173*** 1.090 
(.138) (.455) (.326) (.179) (.298) (.086) 
PW: DACA 
Expiration 0.805 1.170 1.676 1.590 0.989 1.222 
(.176) (.603) (.560) (.790) (.664) (.310) 
2015 5.740** 8.018*** 2.921*** 1.223 1.090 0.875 
(3.044) (3.164) (.527) (.397) (.420) (.131) 
2016 10.581*** 5.280*** 4.195*** 0.431** 1.190 0.595** 
(6.167) (1.310) (1.309) (.128) (.250) (.093) 
2017 12.684*** 7.429*** 6.941*** 1.249 1.263 1.321* 
(7.329) (2.932) (1.650) (.283) (.492) (.170) 
2018 15.970*** 7.683*** 10.031*** 0.422 1.029 1.725* 
(8.357) (3.308) (3.117) (.257) (.250) (.411) 
Word Count  
(ln) 
1.148 1.045 1.281*** 0.948 1.415* 1.207* 
(.109) (.130) (.074) (.077) (.241) (.092) 
Front Page 1.013 0.577** 1.305 0.832 0.996 1.148 
(.197) (.103) (.213) (.205) (.160) (.188) 
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Constant 0.052** 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.292* 0.125** 0.194** 
(.049) (.029) (.011) (.172) (.019) (.094) 
Pseudo R2 
.0907 .0544 .0776 .0392 .0480 .0319 
Note: Odds ratios displayed with standard errors in parenthesis.  All models include 
paperclustered standard errors to adjust for shared variance between articles published in the 
same outlet (*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.)  
Moving on to Table 3, I note five key findings regarding the likelihood that a frame will 
appear in an article as a function of each individual focusing event and policy window.  First, as 
previously addressed, articles published during focusing events are overall more likely to include 
the refugees frame.  According to Table 3, articles published during the first Central American 
migrant crisis (Focusing Event 1); second Central American migrant crisis (Focusing Event 5); 
Focusing Event 6, during which undocumented minors were detained in cages; and the 2018 U.S. 
midterm elections (Focusing Event 8) are all more likely to include the refugees frame than 
articles published outside these focusing events.  Only articles published around the death of 
Kate Steinle (Focusing Event 3) and the U.S. presidential election of Donald Trump (Focusing 
Event 4) are less likely to include the refugees frame.    
Second, similarly to Table 2, Table 3 indicates that articles published during both the 
announcement of the expansion of DACA (Policy Window 1) and the reinstatement of Secure 
Communities (Policy Window 2) are less likely to include the victims frame.  With 2.173 greater 
odds (𝑝<.001), the refugees frame is only more likely to be present in articles published during 
Policy Window 2.    
Third, articles published following Donald Trump’s candidacy announcement and the 
death of Kate Steinle are both more likely to include the criminogenic frame, but differ regarding 
the immigration as a crime frame.  Articles published in conjunction with Trump’s candidacy 
38 
announcement are 39 percent less likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, while 
articles published in response to the death of Kate Steinle have 2.068 greater odds (𝑝<.001) of 
having the immigration as a crime frame present within an article.  Likewise, articles published 
during Focusing Event 4 – during which Donald Trump was elected president and inaugurated – 
are more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, victims frame, and civil/legal frame.  
Alternatively, articles published during this same time period are nearly 53 percent less likely to 
include the criminogenic frame and 57 percent less likely to include the refugees frame.    
Lastly, articles published during the 2018 U.S. midterm elections (Focusing Event 8) are 
less likely to include four frames than articles not published during this time period: the 
criminogenic frame; the protective frame; the immigration as a crime frame; and the civil/legal 
frame.  On the other hand, the refugees frame is 96 percent more likely to be present in an article 
during the 2018 midterm elections.  Worth mention, is that only the articles published during  
Focusing Event 8 are less likely (over 50 percent) to include the protective frame.    
39 
DISCUSSION 
Over the past several decades, the American political landscape has grown increasingly polarized 
on a variety of issues ranging from religious liberty to gun control, especially considering the 
advancements in communicative technology that afford Americans multiple platforms for 
information consumption, and consequentially, political participation (Fourney et al. 2017, Hare 
and Poole 2014).  Although the issue of race has long been a critical point of contention in 
American politics and society, immigration, particularly along the Southern border, has 
reemerged over the past two decades as a fundamental element of both the Republican and  
Democratic Parties’ platforms (Hare and Poole 2014).  Within the rhetoric of immigration, 
particularly from Mexico and Central America, crime remains an important part of the debate as 
to how the foreign-born reshape communities and the fabric of the nation.  Because the majority 
of Americans are not well-versed on the intricacies of immigration or crime and utilize 
information and opinions presented by the media to inform their beliefs, examining media 
behavior is crucial to understanding contemporary American beliefs and attitudes toward 
immigration and crime.    
Several recent studies conclude that while newspaper readership is gradually declining as 
a consequence of increasing news media presence online, newspapers remain “a critical part of 
the American news landscape” and continue to impose significant influence on the American 
public regarding the immigration-crime link debate (Garrett and Stroud 2014, Pew Research 
Center 2019).  Therefore, systematically examining the ways in which narratives and framing 
shift over time, particularly in relation with specific events, is imperative to understanding the 
multifaceted relationship between news media, agenda setting, and the American public.  As 
such, the objective of this study has been to systematically examine changes in media narratives 
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in response to focusing events and policy windows, specifically asking: how does media framing 
of immigration and crime change around focusing events and policy windows over the 20142018 
period?    
First, I found that some immigration-crime frames are more prevalent than others during 
the 2014 – 2018 period.  For example, the criminogenic frame appears in over half of all articles, 
while the immigration as a crime frame appears in 44 percent of articles.  In contrast, the 
protective frame – which is most consistent with empirical research – appears in only 21 percent 
of articles (the refugee and victims frames appear even less frequently in immigration-crime 
articles).  Because articles can contain multiple frames, some appear together in greater 
frequency.  For instance, articles that contain the criminogenic frame are significantly more 
likely to also include the protective, immigration as a crime, and victims frames.  
As a second major finding, some focusing events and policy windows are associated with 
a greater likelihood of some frames occurring as compared to others.  When all focusing events 
are pooled together, only the refugee frame is more likely to be present.  At the same time, Table 
3 illustrates that when measured separately, independent focusing events are more likely to 
include multiple frames not limited to the refugee frame.  For example, articles published 
following the death of Kate Steinle are significantly more likely to include both the criminogenic 
and immigration as a crime frames, while the refugee frame is actually less likely to be present.    
Third, I note similar findings for policy windows, as well.  When all policy windows are 
pooled together, both the immigration as a crime and civil/legal frames are more likely to be 
present.  Similar to focusing events, when each policy window is examined independently, we 
find that additional frames are more likely to appear.  For example, articles published following 
the Trump administration’s announcement to reinstate Secure Communities are more likely to 
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include the refugees frame, while neither the immigration as a crime frame or civil/legal frame 
are more likely to be present in articles published during this period.  Likewise, longer articles 
are also more likely to include the immigration as a crime frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal 
frame, likely due to the complex intricacies of the topics in which these frames appear, as they 
require more substantial explanation than other topics.    
Finally, fourth, some focusing events and policy windows are associated with a 
decreased likelihood of some frames occurring as compared to others.  For instance, while 
articles published during Trump’s announcement of his intention to run for president are more 
likely to include the criminogenic frame, they are also less likely to include the immigration as a 
crime and civil/legal frames.  As another example, articles published during both President  
Obama’s immigration executive orders announcement and President Trump’s reinstatement of 
Secure Communities are less likely to include the victims frame.  Other characteristics of 
immigration-crime articles appear to decrease the likelihood of some frames, as well.  Articles 
that are published on the front page of a newspaper are somewhat less likely to include the 
protective frame than articles not published on the front page of a newspaper.    
Broader Impacts and Theoretical Relevance  
Ultimately, this study contributes to ongoing research regarding the intersection of media and 
public opinion by highlighting discrepancies between the products of empirical research and the 
institutions of journalism and news media.  Despite widespread consensus among criminologists 
that immigration is unassociated with violence in most communities (Ousey and Kubrin 2018), 
the newspaper outlets included in this study published articles utilizing the narratives most 
critical of immigration – the criminogenic and immigration as a crime frames – with greater 
frequency throughout the 2014 – 2018 period than any of the other frames.  Indeed, these two 
42 
frames were used over twice as often the protective frame that best aligns with empirical 
research.  In short, the national news media often provide distorted narratives of immigrants or 
the process of immigration.  
Further, because frames are not equally distributed across each independent focusing 
event and policy window, these findings indicate that frames are strategically employed within 
articles, and that variations in framing are dependent upon the circumstances and context during 
which articles are published.  Importantly, this finding aligns with Kingdon’s multiple-streams 
framework, in which the “problem stream” emerges as an issue or set of circumstances capture 
the attention of a national audience and open the grounds for dialogue.  It is during this national 
discussion that the media landscape systematically responds to events and issues by promoting or 
adhering to specific narratives, promoted by those who are either conforming or combating 
power structures in the political arena, that are then consumed by the general population.  For 
example, my results indicate that news media narratives are not monolithic and do not wax and 
wane in one direction over time.  Instead, frames increase and decrease as they are used by media 
(and the claim makers engaging media outlets) to highlight specific aspects of the immigration-
crime debate when external events occur.  Therefore, this study also aligns with the growing 
body of literature that acknowledges agenda setting as a calculated process by which editorial 
decisionmakers intentionally construct and impose narratives that both reflect and inspire the 
general public’s detrimental association between immigration and crime.    
My findings also speak to changes in news media behavior more broadly.  For example, a 
key finding from the current study shows the criminogenic frame to be more prevalent among 
articles included in the sample than any other frame, particularly more so than the protective 
frame.  While this expectation appears antagonistic towards news media outlets on the surface, 
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contemporary literature and theoretical frameworks of journalistic behavior acknowledge a shift 
in American news media reporting practices during the post-9/11 period, during which 
information-related programming gave way to attention-grabbing “trauma-driven content”  
(Serani 2008:240).  Increasingly, in the current period’s political atmosphere, trauma-driven 
content, especially when occurring during external focusing events, is overrepresented in news 
media publications and often depicts events with “an exaggerated importance, [facts] taken out 
of context” and “highly misleading portrayals” that are intended to reveal dangerous trends in 
immigration and crime (Martin 2018:119).  Thus, my findings illustrate the role played by 
external events or specific policy periods in generating the opportunity for specific 
immigrationcrime content designed to grab attention.  
More so, recent studies find that trauma-oriented narratives, specifically those that 
conceptualize a threat or “villain” beyond the limits of one individual, have an increased ability 
to amplify emotional responses to an event or issue, and “may promote [collective] development 
of intrusive thoughts about the event [or issue]” that can persist with socially detrimental effects 
(Holman et al. 2020:119).  Often, media logic is the rationale behind such publications: media 
outlets wish to increase readership and viewing for financial gain and heightened status, rather 
than to incite widespread panic amongst the public.  Because Americans primarily receive 
information regarding immigrants and crime from these outlets more readily than they do from 
academic sources, though, this tradition of sensationalized reporting cultivates an atmosphere in 
which the public is both desensitized to trauma and loss while simultaneously over aware of a 
predetermined threat that may not empirically exist, particularly as is the case with Latino 
immigrants.  For instance, the accidental shooting of Kate Steinle by García Zárate became 
highly politicized as media coverage of Steinle’s death reached national headlines in 2015.   
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Despite the ultimate acquittal of all murder and manslaughter charges brought against García 
Zárate in 2017, the narrative of dangerous immigrants lurking in the shadows of American 
society persisted throughout legal proceedings.  Such dialogue further aggravated discrepancies 
within the immigration-crime link debate by encouraging the public to characterize immigrants 
as inherently threatening, as well as drawing criticism to the legality and safety of sanctuary  
cities.   
Although this study does not measure the role of race in media coverage of immigrants 
and crime, a plethora of studies agree that race and ethnicity permeate discourse about the  
“overall social and economic well-being” of the United States (Rivera 2014:45), particularly with 
negative portrayals of Latinx immigrants (Moriearty 2010).  For instance, a 2008 report by the 
Brookings Institute found that “coverage of Latinos and immigration” focuses “almost 
exclusively on undocumented [Latinx} immigrants and immigration, lacks important context, 
and often frames immigration as a crisis” (Reny and Manzano 2016:197).  With consideration to 
the 2014-2018 period, the issue of Latinx immigrants and immigration became a focal point in 
the national news media landscape in mid-2015, and remains so, primarily as a result of Donald 
Trump’s candidacy announcement, anti-immigrant rhetoric, and closed borders platform (Finley 
and Esposito 2019).  As such, a reasonable assumption can be made about this study’s findings 
that not only are immigrants framed negatively and dangerously more so than they are positively 
and sympathetically, as is the case with the criminogenic and immigration as a crime frame, but 
that the immigrants in question are overwhelmingly Latinx.    
The findings of this study also conform to the body of literature revolving around 
contemporary media behavior in reference to the rarity of the protective and victims frames 
throughout the articles included in our sample.  Although the victims frames can be considered 
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trauma-driven content, this frame places ownership of the trauma back onto American society 
and American institutions, as opposed to placing blame on immigrants themselves, and therefore 
creates a narrative that Americans, in general, are less likely to seek out (Serani 2008).  As well, 
because the protective frame does not align with media logic – in the sense that this frame quells 
concerns about immigration and crime rather than generalizing immigrant perpetrators to the 
immigrant population – these findings were not unexpected.    
In addition, the pattern of findings across the multivariate models suggests that, while 
some frames (e.g. the criminogenic, immigration as a crime, and civil/legal frames) are more 
prevalent than others (the protective, victims, and refugee frames), the majority of articles do not 
express sentiment that is fundamentally anti-immigration.  Rather, they acknowledge the 
immigration-crime link and refute its assumptions by employing additional frames that often 
counter more antagonistic narratives (e.g., point and counterpoint).  For example, although the 
protective frame appears in only 21 percent of articles included in our sample, as opposed to the 
criminogenic frame which appears in 55 percent of articles, these two frames often appear 
alongside one another.  This suggests that a significant proportion of these articles are at least 
somewhat sympathetic toward immigrants and attempt to utilize empirical research concluding 
that immigrants are less crime-prone than Americans, rather than antagonistically portraying 
behaviors exhibited by the immigrant population as inherently criminal.  As an example,  
Valverde’s 2016 Tampa Bay Times article acknowledges Donald Trump’s claim that Mexican 
immigrants are murderers and rapists – thereby employing the criminogenic frame – while going 
on to cite the American Immigration Council’s report finding that immigrant males are 
significantly less likely to be incarcerated for violent crimes than their native-born white 
counterparts, in which the protective frame is employed.  Put simply, media framing is complex 
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and involves the interplay between often competing narratives appearing during the same policy 
windows and focusing events, including occasionally within the same articles.  
As previously noted, longer articles are more likely to include the immigration as a crime 
frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal frame than shorter articles in the sample.  Articles which 
utilize these frames may be longer because the issues which these frames cover tend to be more 
complex, and time consuming, than topics presented using other frames.  The criminogenic 
frame, for example, is often present in articles that quote Donald Trump during the 2014-2018 
time frame.  These articles are short, to the point, and typically opinion pieces – especially with 
consideration to the limited nature of Trump’s claims, as well as readily available data that 
precisely contradicts such claims.  Alternatively, as is the case with the immigration as a crime 
frame, refugee frame, and civil/legal frame, these articles tend to explore the intricacies of 
immigration, regional immigrant communities, and the socioeconomic conditions of the sending 
countries from which immigrants come and are, therefore, longer than articles in which other 
frames are present.  Such a pattern relative to the length of articles is pertinent to understanding 
the relationship between media behavior and public opinion, especially considering changes in 
consumer behavior over the past two decades.  As Molyneux finds in his 2017 study, while 
widespread media access via smartphone is advantageous for consumers because it increases 
access to news and information by proxy, this rapid, instantaneous access has created a  
“snacking” or “grazing” culture in which consumers spend more time browsing the news, but 
less time ingesting information and understanding issues in which society is concerned.  
Therefore, some immigration-crime frames likely reflect the need to write for the grazing public 
with shorter, more simplistic narratives.  
Limitations and Future Research 
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Overall, when systematically measuring shifts in media behavior utilizing the frames, I find that 
frames do not appear arbitrarily over time, but rather correspond with specific events.  Yet, this 
study is not without limitations that may direct future empirical endeavors.  First, I only use data 
from seven of the largest national newspapers, rather than examining local or regional 
newspapers.  It remains possible that policy windows and focusing events may provoke greater 
change in some places than in others, a point this study cannot address. Second, I also only 
utilize data from print newspapers, rather than pulling data from all Internet, television, and 
social media-oriented news outlets.  Although many of the outlets in our sample circulate print 
articles as online supplements, it would not have been feasible for this study to capture all of the 
sources with articles that engage in the immigration-crime link debate.  Future research would do 
well to include a variety of news media platforms, particularly featuring online-only platforms, 
in examining how media frame and compose narratives regarding immigration and crime.    
Third, the temporal span of the articles included in this study ranges only from 2014 to 
2018, while the association between immigration and crime has intensified in media presence 
and public opinion since the turn of the 21st century.  While measuring Donald Trump’s rise to 
the presidency is valuable for understanding media behavior over the past half-decade, especially 
considering that Trump became the primary political claims maker as early as his candidacy 
announcement, the immigration-crime link debate extends far back beyond 2014.  Additional 
research systematically examining changes in framing and media behavior prior to 2014 may be 
insightful to understanding the degree to which Trump’s rhetoric manipulated and informed 
national discourse (see for example, Harris and Gruenewald 2019).    
Fourth, although this study is concerned with media behavior regarding immigration and 
crime, it does not address differences in media behavior regarding race or immigrants’ countries 
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of origin.  In the 2014 to 2018 period, concerns regarding the U.S.-Mexico border dominated 
national dialogue regarding immigration and crime, during which Mexican immigrants became 
the primary focus of the majority of articles included in the sample.  The current study does not 
measure or address differences in narratives between Mexican immigrants or refugees from 
Central America or Syria, although these topics also flooded national discourse during this 
period.  While it is beyond the scope of the current study, future research might acknowledge the 
role of race in media narratives and how they pertain to public opinion.  
As socioeconomic conditions in sending countries continue to deteriorate and news 
outlets continue to prioritize antagonistic narratives about the foreign-born, the 
immigrationcrime link debate is likely to persist at the national scale for the foreseeable future.   
Systematically examining media behavior as it responds to immigration and crime is pertinent to 
understanding the intersection of public opinion, consumer behavior, and political outcomes, 
particularly so as technological advancements expand further into the routine activities of daily 
life.  With widespread access to smartphone technology, Americans are consuming news at a 
higher and quicker rate than ever before.  As a result, American consumers neglect to critically 
analyze information through an empirical lens, and therefore increasingly accept “fake news” 
sources at a higher rate than before (Pew Research Center 2018).  Overall, the burden of proof 
falls upon American consumers to understand and navigate systematic changes in media 
behavior around social and political events as a means to inform public opinion on immigration 
and crime.   
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APPENDIX  
Table 4. Pearson’s Correlation Matrix for All Key Variables Across Sample of Articles. (n=1,720). 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Criminogenic (1) 
Protective (2) 
Imm. As Crime (3) 
Victims (4) 
Refugee (5) 
Civil/Legal (6) 
All Focusing Events (7) 
FE: CA Migrant Crisis (8) 
FE: Trump Candidacy (9) 
FE: Kate Steinle (10) 
FE: Trump Election (11) 
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2 (12) 
FE: Kids in Cages (13) 
FE: Mollie Tibbetts (14) 
FE: 2018 Midterms (15) 
All Policy Windows (16) 
PW: DACA Expansion (17) 
PW: Secure Communities (18) 
PW: DACA Expiration (19) 
2014 (20) 
2015 (21)  
2016 (22)  
2017 (23)  
2018 (24)  
Word Count (ln) (25) 
Front Page (26) 
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
1.00 
.27*** 1.00 
.23*** .03 1.00 
.17*** -.07** -.12*** 1.00 
-.04 -.01 -.01 .06* 1.00 
-.03 -.09*** .36*** -.01 .09*** 1.00 
.00 .01 .04 -.06* .04 .01 1.00 
-.16*** -.08*** -.10*** .01 .13*** -.02 .33*** 1.00 
.11*** .14*** -.04 -.02 .06* -.06** .30*** -.03 1.00 
.11*** .14*** -.03 -.12 .06* -.05* .34*** -.04 .77*** 1.00 
-.07** -.04 .04 .00 -.06* .03 .42*** -.05* -.04 -.05* 1.00 
.02 -.01 .05* -.03 .02 .05 .24*** -.03 -.03 -.03 -.04 
.07** .04 .11*** -.05* .05* .06* .35*** -.04 -.04 -.04 -.05* 
.05* .01 .07** -.03 .00 -.02 .31*** -.04 -.03 -.04 -.05 
-.00 -.03 -.02 -.01 .03 .00 .31*** -.03 -.03 -.04 -.04 
-.01 .01 .06* -.03 .05 .06* -.12*** -.06* -.06* -.06** -.08** 
-.10*** -.05* -.09*** -.03 -.04 .01 -.07** -.02 -.02 -.03 -.03 
.03 .04 .08*** -.02 .08** .04 -.14*** -.05 -.04 -.05* -.06* 
.02 .01 .07** -.01 .00 .05* .06* -.03 -.02 -.03 -.03 
-.28*** -.14*** -.20*** -.00 .05* .02 .09*** .59*** -.06* -.07** -.08*** 
-.01 .11*** -.10*** .06* -.06* -.06* .03 -.08*** .43*** .48*** -.10*** 
.00 -.06* -.04 -.08** -.04 -.11*** -.10*** -.12*** -.11*** -.12*** -.34*** 
.09*** .05 .11*** .10*** .03 .09*** -.33*** -.12*** -.11*** -.12*** -.09*** 
.11*** .02 .16*** -.08** .03 .09*** .39*** -.10*** -.09*** -.10*** -.12*** 
.05* -.00 .10*** -.02 .08*** .06** .04 -.01 -.07** -.07* .07** 
.00 -.07** .07** -.03 .02 .04 .03 .01 -.05* -.04 .04 
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Table 4, Cont.  
(12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19)
FE: CA Migrant Crisis 2 (12)   
FE: Kids in Cages (13)   
FE: Mollie Tibbetts (14)   
FE: 2018 Midterms (15)   
All Policy Windows (16)   
PW: DACA Expansion (17)   
PW: Secure Communities (18)   
PW: DACA Expiration (19)   
2014 (20)  
2015 (21)  
2016 (22)  
2017 (23)  
2018 (24)  
Word Count (ln) (25)  
Front Page (26)  
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001.  
1.00 
-.03 1.00 
-.03 .10*** 1.00 
-.03 -.04 -.03 1.00 
.16*** -.06** -.06* -.06* 1.00 
-.02 -.03 -.02 -.02 .40*** 1.00 
-.03 -.05* -.04 -.04 .78*** -.03 1.00 
.42*** .03 -.02 -.02 .43*** -.02 -.03 1.00 
-.05 -.07** -.06* -.06* .08*** .39*** -.08*** -.04 
-.06* -.09*** -.08** -.08** -.13*** -.05* -.10*** -.06* 
-.08*** -.13*** -.11*** -.11*** -.19*** -.08** -.15*** -.08*** 
-.09*** -.13*** -.11*** -.11*** .24*** -.08** .39*** -.08*** 
.28*** .41*** .37*** .36*** .00 -.06** -.12*** .27*** 
-.01 .04 .02 .03 -.05 -.10*** -.01 .00 
.00 .04 .02 .04 .05* -.01 .06* .02 
